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Professor David Blandford visited Massey University as a 1999 Venture Trust 
International Fellow.  He has a distinguished career as an agricultural economist, 
specialising in agricultural trade and policy. After spending the 1980s at Cornell 
University (USA), he was appointed Head of Division in the Directorate for Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries at the OECD in Paris in 1988. In late 1998, Professor 
Blandford took up his current position as Head of Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociolgy at the Pennsylvania State University. 
 
This Discussion Paper is an extended version of a public seminar he presented at 
Massey University. A new Round of international trade negotiations, to include 
trade in agricultural products, is due to commence in the next couple of months. 
Despite the successes of the previous Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, many 
and sometimes substantial barriers to agricultural and food products trade still exist. 
Considerable thought is currently being applied to the agenda for the new 
negotiating Round, and the approaches that might be taken. Will countries be 
satisfied with the previous approach of reforms to market access, export subsidies 
and domestic support being further pursued? Will some of the so-called ‘new trade 
issues’, such as the activities of state-owned enterprises and marketing boards, or 
trade in genetically-modified foods  be subject to negotiation? Will developing 
countries have an agenda different from that of the industrialized economies? And 
will the USA be as forceful an exponent for freer agricultural trade as was the case 
in the Uruguay Round? This Discussion Paper addresses several of these issues, and 
















The Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that takes place in 
Seattle from November 30 to December 3 will launch a new round of trade 
negotiations on agriculture. During the last round of negotiations – the Uruguay 
Round – the United States had clear objectives for agriculture – to bring the sector 
under effective international trade disciplines, increase access for U.S. agricultural 
exports to foreign markets, and limit competition from subsidized exports. There 
was broad support for these aims among domestic agricultural interests, and at least 
tacit support for the negotiations among the population as a whole. 
 
The situation this time is less clear. Despite a period of sustained economic 
expansion without parallel in U.S. history, low inflation, high prices in equity 
markets, and the virtual elimination of involuntary unemployment, support for trade 
liberalization is fragile. In some segments of society – among environmental lobby 
groups and organized labour, for example – there is outright opposition to further 
trade liberalization. In the agricultural sector, depressed prices and greater 
international competition have led to a weakening of support for liberal trade. This, 
coupled with the uncertainty that is inevitably associated with upcoming 
presidential and congressional elections in November 2000, makes it difficult to 
determine the likely U.S. position in the negotiations.  
In fact, there are a whole series of views on these negotiations in the United States – 
their desirability, what we should seek to achieve, and what would be a good or bad 
outcome. Current and future administrations will probably have different views on 
these issues to those of the Congress, various interest groups – such as farmers, 
agribusiness, and environmentalists – will have differing perspectives, and 
subgroups within these will also. The attitude of U.S. sugar farmers is likely to 
differ from that of soybean farmers, the attitude of dairy farmers in one region of 
the country may differ from dairy farmers in another. In the final analysis, it will be 
the domestic political climate during the negotiations that will determine the U.S. 
negotiating stance. If this is conducive to freer trade, U.S. negotiators will probably 
seek significant changes in trade policies; if the mood is more protectionist, they 
will be far less ambitious. 
 
In this paper, I shall attempt to identify what the Unite States might seek to achieve 
in the negotiations, and the factors that will help or hinder the pursuit of a trade 
liberalizing approach. My focus will be primarily on domestic constraints, although 
I shall also comment on some of the key factors that will influence the attitudes of 
other major players in the negotiations.  5
 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) – What 
did it give us? 
 
The Uruguay Round negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) were launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986. They 
ended more than seven years later with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, 
Morocco in April 1994. The Uruguay Round, the eighth in a series of tariff-cutting 
rounds stretching back to 1947, was particularly significant since it was the first 
time that a serious attempt was made to address agricultural trade barriers. In the 
final analysis, only limited progress was actually achieved in reducing barriers to 
agricultural trade under the URAA. Indeed, it could be argued that the results were 
only loosely consistent with the principle of non-discrimination that forms the 
cornerstone of the GATT. However, the Agreement does provide a basis for the 
future reduction of barriers to agricultural trade. 
 
Major elements of the Agreement 
The Agreement is quite complicated, and there are a number of special provisions 
and exceptions (Josling et al.). However, the major elements are: 
1.  Market access – non-tariff barriers were converted into tariffs 
and bound (set at fixed rates); the bound tariffs are being reduced 
over the life of the Agreement (1995-2000) for a total reduction 
of 36 percent on average (and a minimum of 15 percent per tariff 
line); countries agreed to provide a minimum level of access for 
imports (i.e. volume of imports subject to tariffs below the bound 
rates) equivalent to 3 percent of domestic consumption, rising to 
5 percent over the life of the agreement (there are safeguards – 
additional duties can be imposed if there are sudden surges of 
imports or drops in import prices). 
2.  Export subsidies – outlays on export subsidies are being reduced 
by 36 percent and the volume of subsidized exports by 21 
percent. 
3.  Domestic support – expenditures estimated under the aggregate 
measure of support (AMS) are to be reduced by 20 percent, with 
the exception of “green box” measures, i.e. those judged to be 
minimally trade distorting (there were other exceptions relating 
to “blue box” measures that are discussed further below). 
 
The base period used in calculating the minimum access level and other 
components is 1986-88, with the exception of the export subsidy commitments for 
which it is 1986-90. 
  6
Tariffication and market access 
One of the major achievements of the Agreement was tariffication – the conversion 
of non-tariff barriers into tariff barriers. The pervasive use of non-tariff barriers and 
the lack of transparency that such barriers create was a major cause of distortion in 
international agricultural markets in the years leading up to the Uruguay Round. 
However, the bound tariffs agreed in the URAA are often very high. Indeed there 
were allegations of “dirty tariffication”, i.e. that tariffs had been set at levels in 
excess of the tariff equivalent of the trade barriers that they replaced. The years 
1986-88 used as a base period for the calculations were ones in which world prices 
were relatively low; this contributed to the establishment of high tariffs. 
Furthermore in many cases, the bound tariffs were above the rates actually applied, 
meaning that the agreed tariff reduction was a nominal rather than an effective 
reduction. This meant that countries could actually increase the applied tariff if they 
so chose, and still stay within their URAA commitments. The fact that the 
Agreement called for an average reduction of 36 percent meant that countries could 
choose to reduce tariffs by a larger percentage on less sensitive commodities, while 
maintain the maximum level of protection on sensitive commodities. At the end of 
the implementation period, average bound tariffs on agricultural products will be 40 
percent ad valorem, compared to an average for industrial tariffs of 4 percent 
(Wainio et al). 
 
An examination of the tariff schedules from the URAA reveals that they are often 
very complicated.  There is a mixture of specific and ad valorem tariffs, some 
combine ad valorem rates with minimum specific rates, some tariffs vary by season, 
some are so tightly defined with respect to product characteristics and packaging 
that they are clearly designed to apply to certain suppliers, and in some cases tariffs 
vary for the same product on the basis of its end use in the importing country. Many 
of the tariff schedules are long and complex - the U.S. tariff schedule for dairy 
products, for example, is fourteen pages long. One of the traditional arguments in 
favour of tariffs is that they provide transparency – an exporter knows in advance 
what duty will be applied. To some extent this is true, but the exporter may need the 
help of a lawyer to help in deciphering the tariff schedules before attempting to 
enter overseas markets. 
 
The introduction of a quantitative trade control element through the market access 
provision was a mixed blessing. TRQs provide the opportunity for exporting 
countries to gain entry to markets from which they would otherwise be excluded 
given the high tariff bindings, particularly when the applied tariffs are also high. 
The Agreement did not specify the level of in-quota tariffs that could be applied, 
and these vary considerably across countries and commodities. Most significantly, 
the TRQs have created a complicated system of regulated trade that has stimulated 
rent-seeking behavior by exporters and importers. The URAA did not specify how 
the TRQs were to be allocated nor how they were to be administered. As with the 
bound tariffs, countries were able to design their TRQs to minimize the impact of 
trade on sensitive commodities. They were able to allocate quotas in ways that  7
provide access to certain countries on a preferential basis. In many cases, the 
volume of imports has been less than that allowed under TRQs. It is not clear if this 
is due to a lack of consumer demand for the imported product, relatively high in-
quota tariffs, inefficiencies created by the licensing system, or just plain 
discrimination. My own personal experience during the negotiations suggests that 
some negotiators recognized that the TRQ system could turn into a monster, 
whereas others did not foresee the problems that would result from its creation. 
 
Export subsidies 
The use of export subsidies, in particular by the European Union and the United 
States was a major source of trade conflict in the years leading up to the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. The limitations placed on the use of subsidies were, therefore, 
a major achievement of the Round. 
 
Relatively high world prices for many commodities in the late 1990s have helped 
many countries to meet their export subsidy commitments under the URAA without 
too much difficulty. As world prices moved closer to domestic prices in subsidizing 
countries, the subsidy per unit for many products declined. However, there has been 
some political activity on the subsidy front. One area of controversy has been 
whether a country can “bank” its unused subsidies and carry them over from year to 
year. Hungary obtained a waiver from its export subsidy commitment on the 
grounds that it had made a mistake in calculating its base period subsidy outlays. 
Complaints have been lodged with the WTO against Canada and the European 
Union on their use of subsidies on dairy products. There have been discussions on 
bringing export credits and credit guarantees under some sort of discipline, but little 
progress has been made in this area. Under the URAA bona fide food aid 
transactions and export promotion activities were exempted from restrictions, but 
there are rumblings of discontent in some countries about the use of these measures 
by other countries. 
 
Domestic support 
Recognition by policymakers that domestic policies were the underlying cause of 
many of the distortions in international agricultural trade, was a major contribution 
to progress under the Uruguay Round negotiations. It was a considerable 
achievement that the URAA imposes disciplines on some type of domestic policy 
measures. Those policies that are judged to have the greatest impact on trade – the 
so-called “amber box” policies are the ones targeted in the URAA. The amount of 
support provided by these policies is subject to an agreed reduction. Some trade 
distorting policies were given a temporary exemption – the so-called “blue-box” 
policies – although how temporary this exemption will prove to be remains to be 
seen. The policy measures involved were the direct payments used by the European 
Union and the United States (prior to new farm legislation in 1996). Policies that 
were judged to have a minimal impact on trade – the so-called “green box” policies 
were exempted, as were certain other policies. In 1995, of the total of US$286 in  8
domestic support notified to the WTO, 45 percent was placed in the green box 
category, 40 percent was amber, and 12 percent was blue (Nelson et al.). 
  
Many countries are attempting to shift their support towards the green box category 
– at least in name if not in substance. There is an increasing tendency in Europe and 
Japan to argue that a variety of payments have environmental objectives and are 
therefore exempt. The United States, after first reducing significantly the support 
that is directly coupled to production by eliminating deficiency payments in the 
1996 Farm Act (blue box), is now tending to regress under the pressure of low farm 
prices. There has been a return to the use of various measures that are included 
under the blue or amber box categories of support. 
 
Other contributions of the Round 
The three pillars of the URAA – tariffication and market access, export subsidies, 
and domestic support – were not the only contributions of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement. A relatively weak dispute settlement procedure, relying heavily on 
consensus, has been replaced by one that relies on adjudication. This has resulted in 
the filing of a substantial number of agriculturally related complaints. Two of these 
that have generated substantial publicity and public interest in the United States are 
the banana case, in which the United States and several Latin American countries 
challenged the European Union’s practice of providing preferential access to its 
markets for bananas grown in former colonies and its dependencies. The second is 
the complaint brought by the United States against the European Union’s ban on 
imports of beef produced using growth-promoting hormones. In both cases, the 
European Union has been judged to be in violation of its obligations. As a result of 
arbitration through the WTO in the beef hormone case, the United States is 
imposing prohibitive tariffs on imports valued at $116.8 million from the Union. It 
has proposed the imposition of prohibitive tariffs on an additional range of imports 
in response to the refusal of the Union to change its policies on banana imports. 
 
The beef hormone case relates to two further outcomes of the Uruguay Round – the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS 
Agreement), and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT 
Agreement). The SPS Agreement requires that the application of barriers to trade to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health should be based on an assessment of 
the risks posed and on scientific evidence. The TBT Agreement seeks to ensure that 
imported products are accorded the same treatment in terms of technical 
requirements relating to packaging, marking and labeling, testing and certification 
procedures, and other requirements. Both of these agreements attempt to bring 
greater transparency into the rules and regulations that affect trade. The hormone 
case, which was brought under the SPS Agreement, the growing controversy over 
trade in genetically modified organisms, not to mention other concerns relating to 
the environment and to animal welfare, suggests that there is likely to be increasing 




What would the United States like to see from the upcoming 
round? 
 
A characteristically guarded assessment by the OECD Secretariat summed up the 
results of the URAA as follows: “While the Agreement incorporates a number of 
highly significant and beneficial systemic changes to the trading system for 
agricultural products, actual impacts on trade and policy over the implementation 
period, particularly in the early years, may prove to be modest.” (OECD, 1995 p. 
58). That assessment seems to have been accurate. The Agreement has generated 
few changes in domestic agricultural policies. Such changes as have occurred – 
such as those in the United States – or are planned – such as those in the European 
Union are driven less by trade concerns than by budgetary or foreign policy 
concerns. 
 
The United States took an aggressive stance towards agricultural trade liberalization 
in the Uruguay Round. A 1987 U.S. proposal called for the elimination of 
agricultural subsidies affecting trade, and the phasing out of export subsidies and 
import barriers – all within a ten year period (Josling et al). This served to set the 
goals for the Round at a higher level than many other countries were considering at 
the time, although it is fortunate for the United States that the domestic political 
difficulties that would have been created by actually having to eliminate its 
domestic subsidies never had to be faced. Now that bound tariffs are in place, the 
implications of reducing those tariffs for the parts of U.S. agriculture that are likely 
to face the strongest competition from imports is abundantly clear to the interest 
groups involved. Furthermore, the mood in the Congress has not been strongly in 
favour of freer trade in recent years. 
 
The negotiating process 
The way things have worked in the United States in recent years is as follows: 
1.  The President indicates the administration’s objectives for the 
trade negotiations to Congress. 
2.  The President requests that the Congress grant the authority to 
enter into negotiations – the legislation includes a “fast-track 
procedure” by which the Congress must approve or reject the 
resulting agreement without amendment. This provision has 
existed since the Trade Act of 1974 under which the Tokyo 
Round of trade negotiations were conducted, because of the 
difficulty for the administration in concluding an agreement 
with other countries if this could subsequently be modified by 
the Congress. 
3.  The administration enters into the negotiations – the Special 
Trade Representative’s Office takes the lead role – and attempts  10
to conclude an agreement within the time frame specified in the 
legislation. If this is not done, the President has to request an 
extension of the negotiating authority – the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 under which the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were conducted – expired on June 1, 1993. As it 
transpired, the administration had to request an extension of the 
fast-track negotiating authority in order to conclude the 
negotiations. This can be very hazardous, particularly if the 
outline of a final agreement is known and those who would lose 
from it have the opportunity to mobilize opposition in the 
Congress. 
4.  The final agreement is delivered to the Congress, which votes 
on the legislation required for its implementation. 
 
This procedure may sound as though Congress is largely sidelined during the 
negotiations, but that is not the case. The President must notify and consult with 
Congress prior to entering into a trade agreement. Congress exercises oversight of 
the negotiating process and is closely involved in drafting the enabling legislation. 
The administration has to take care to make sure that it has the votes to pass the 
necessary legislation. Consequently, the negotiations do not proceed in isolation 
from the Congress. 
 
The recent experience with the administration’s efforts to renew the fast-track 
authority has not been encouraging. In 1998, the administration requested renewal 
in order to enter into trade negotiations with Latin American counties, most notably 
with Chile. Several members of Congress have been very vocal in their opposition 
to the renewal of the authority. Some believe that the negotiations cede too much 
power to international entities, like the WTO. Some are sensitive to resistance to 
further trade liberalization by various interest groups. Several labour unions are 
opposed on the grounds that trade liberalization threatens the jobs and standard of 
living of Americans because other countries have less strict employment rules and 
lower wage rates than in the United States. Some environmental groups have 
expressed their opposition on the grounds that freer trade threatens the environment. 
The effectiveness of the administration in seeking congressional approval has been 
undermined by the President’s personal and political problems. 
 
It is unclear how vigorous or successful the current administration will be in 
pressing for the renewal of the fast-track authority to conduct a new round of 
negotiations under the WTO. We are rapidly approaching the final year of the 
current administration. Campaigning for the presidential and congressional 
elections in 2000 is well underway. It may be difficult for the administration to 
secure the votes necessary to approve the necessary legislation as the political 
campaign proceeds. Farmers’ confidence in the benefits of freer trade has been 
shaken by the collapse of prices in the wake of economic problems in Asia and in  11
other emerging markets. It is likely that we shall have to wait for a new 
administration to press for the authority to conduct the negotiations. 
 
The administration (U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Trade Representative) is 
conducting a series of “listening sessions” around the United States to obtain public 
input into the agenda for the upcoming round of negotiations. The U.S. Trade 
Representative, Ambassador Barshefsky, observed “Through these listening 
sessions, USTR and USDA will learn first-hand which issues are most important to 
farmers, ranchers, and the entire agriculture industry, and what trade policies would 
be most effective in helping to increase U.S. agricultural exports. USTR and USDA 
negotiators will continuously review the recommendations from these sessions in 
developing our negotiating objectives for the next round of agricultural 
negotiations” (Press release, May 5, 1999). 
 
U.S. objectives in the upcoming round 
The current administration has signaled its principal objectives for the round. These 
may be modified somewhat, particularly under a new administration. However, they 
are probably fairly representative of what U.S. negotiators are likely to be seeking. 
They may be summarized as follows: 
1.  Substantial reductions in bound and applied tariffs. 
2. Substantial modification to the TRQ system – either by 
increasing the market access percentage, or by cutting the over-
quota tariffs. Some combination of these, if of a sufficient size 
could render the TRQs essentially redundant. 
3.  A further substantial reduction, if not the elimination, of export 
subsidies. 
4.  The imposition of disciplines on the activities of state trading 
enterprises, such as marketing boards, since monopoly importers 
or monopsony exporters are viewed as restricting trade or 
presenting unfair competition. 
5.  Maintenance of strong rules under the SPS and TBT agreements, 
so that countries are not able to use these to establish barriers to 
imports on the basis of production practices or genetic material. 
6.  Tightening of restrictions on the use of disguised subsidies (for 
example, green support that is trade distorting) or nontariff trade 
barriers, and the elimination of the “blue box” category of 
measures (providing that the United States can continue to 
provide support, when needed, under the green box category). 
7.  Continued strengthening of the dispute settlement procedure to 
insure that the rules are enforced and that suitable sanctions are 
imposed on violators. 
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It is currently unclear what the U.S. attitude will be on the degree to which 
countries should be permitted to pursue domestic objectives, with respect to the 
environment for example, and still meet their international obligations. Yet, 
achieving progress in the negotiations is likely to depend on how such domestic 
objectives and concerns can be satisfied in the key players. The challenge will be to 
promote the use of domestic and border measures that are minimally trade distorting 
in order to achieve such domestic objectives, so that the more distorting policy 





What are the constraints in the United States to achieving these 
aims? 
 
In addition to the problems that the current and future administrations are likely to 
face in obtaining the necessary authority to conduct a further round of trade 
negotiations, there are a number of specific agricultural constraints that will have to 
be overcome. As the Uruguay Round unfolded it was clear that the main U.S. aim 
was to provide a framework under which future negotiations could make progress 
on trade barriers, and to obtain some immediate benefits for U.S. agriculture 
through a modest increase in export opportunities and reduction in subsidized 
exports from other countries. The main commodities affected by this strategy were 
the bulk commodities, such as grain and oilseeds. The more sensitive domestic 
commodities, such as dairy products and sugar, were largely unaffected by the 
results of the negotiations. Apart from a few exceptions during periods of high 
domestic prices, exporters of dairy products have not found it profitable to ship to 
the U.S. market given the high over-quota tariffs that they face. U.S. dairy exports 
have generally been modest and have mostly been under government programs. 
 
Support for trade liberalization 
The degree of support by U.S. agricultural interests for a new round of trade 
negotiations will be important for U.S. negotiators. Even though the upcoming 
negotiations will cover other areas – in particular, services – it would be extremely 
difficult for any administration to sell a trade deal to the Congress that did not 
include some benefits for agriculture, regardless of the size of the benefits that an 
agreement might yield in other areas. As yet, the possibility of further agricultural 
trade liberalization is not a major item on the domestic political agenda. Farm 
groups are far more concerned by other matters, such as low domestic prices for 
many commodities, such as grains, oilseeds and pork, because of increased 
production and relatively weak market demand. There is far greater debate about 
structural changes, such as the development of some very large pig or milk 
producing farms, mergers and acquisitions in the processing and marketing sector, 
and environmental issues, such as those associate with intensive animal agriculture, 
than about the possibility of further trade liberalization.   13
 
The fall in the prices of many farm commodities during the last two years, due to a 
reduction in overseas demand and increases in production, has generated a flurry of 
political activity. A recent analysis of the situation suggests that the fall in farm 
prices has been primarily due to increased production, rather than due to a fall in 
demand (Doering and Paarlberg). In other words, farmers’ own decisions and the 
weather (for crops) are at the root of the problem. Whatever the cause, politicians 
have been eager to show that they are sensitive to farmers’ problems and to offer 
them financial support. Although farmers only represent 2 percent of the working 
population in the United States, they continue to exert substantial influence on the 
political process. 
 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the United States was 
able to introduce a major reform of its farm legislation. The 1996 Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) which is in effect through 2002, 
eliminated the commodity-specific deficiency payments and planting restrictions 
that had been the centerpiece of earlier legislation, replacing these with payments 
that are decoupled from farmers’ planting decisions for individual crops. With 
declining farm prices additional measures have been taken to support prices and 
farm incomes. These include government purchases of some commodities, the 
provision of additional cash payments and an increase in funding for loans. It is not 
certain how much additional financial assistance will be provided to farmers this 
year, but it is clear that this will be in excess of $7 billion. Total payments to 
farmers under the Fair Act and the further measures taken by the administration and 
passed by the Congress will likely reach $16.6 billion, second only to the 1987 
record of $16.7 billion (Morehart). 
  
During the Uruguay round, U.S. agricultural interests were generally supportive of 
the aim of liberalizing agricultural trade. Commodity sectors that we seen as having 
the most to gain, such as grains and oilseeds, were naturally in favour of changes 
that could increase their access to overseas markets. Commodity sectors that were 
fearful of the impact of trade liberalization, such as dairy and sugar, were reassured 
by the fact that they the outcome of the Uruguay Round would not be likely to 
subject them to greater competition from abroad. 
 
As we enter a new round of negotiations, support for freer trade among agricultural 
interest groups has weakened considerably. There has been a natural tendency by 
politicians and some agricultural interests to emphasize the positive aspects of freer 
trade, such as easier access to markets and less competition from subsidized exports 
by other countries. There has been a reluctance to acknowledge that freer trade 
might mean greater competition in domestic markets, and that international trade 
can be risky. The reduction in demand for U.S. agricultural exports in the wake of 
financial crises in Asia in recent years came as a shock to some who had been led to 
believe that international demand and prices could only head in one direction – 
upwards.  14
 
Consequently, among U.S. agriculture as a whole there may be less enthusiastic 
support for the upcoming round of negotiations than during the Uruguay Round. 
Among those segments who would clearly gain from an expansion of market access 
and further reduction in subsidized competition, such as the grain and oilseeds 
complex, there is likely to be more skepticism about the negotiations and their 
potential benefits than previously. Among those segments of agriculture that could 
face a significant increase in competitive pressure as a result of trade liberalization, 
there is already outright opposition to the negotiations. This is the case for sugar. 
 
Sugar 
The domestic sugar industry has traditionally opposed trade liberalization
1. Prior to 
the Uruguay Round it operated under a protective system of import quotas. The 
volume of imports was tightly regulated in order to keep domestic sugar prices 
above world prices. Under the URAA, a TRQ with a variable quota has achieved 
the same result. Domestic sugar prices are roughly double those on international 
markets. As a result, lower-cost sweeteners, such as high fructose corn sweetener, 
have made substantial inroads into the market, particularly in processed foods and 
beverages. There is opposition to trade liberalization by the sugar industry and by 
the sweetener industry as a whole as a result of this situation, since both anticipate 
that cheaper imports would displace them from domestic markets. On the other 
hand, large users of sweeteners, such as the soft drinks industry, support trade 
liberalization since this would allow them access to cheaper sources of supply. The 
U.S. sugar lobby is a powerful political force that is likely to be very active in its 
opposition to any liberalization of sugar imports. 
 
However, a foreign policy dimension complicates the sugar situation. The exporters 
of sugar and related products to the United States are primarily developing countries 
– Latin American and Caribbean countries provide roughly 50 percent of total 
imports by value and roughly 70 percent of the volume of cane and beet sugar 
imports. Access to the high-priced U.S. sugar market has been used to further U.S. 
foreign policy objectives, including economic development in the Western 
Hemisphere. Given the current political situation, exports from one of the largest 
sugar producers in the region – Cuba – are excluded from the U.S. market. An 
interesting situation could emerge if political and economic reform occurred in 
Cuba. Any substantive movement to democracy and a market economy in Cuba 
would place enormous pressure on U.S. politicians to help the country 
economically. One of the options that would inevitably arise would be to open the 
U.S. market to sugar imports from Cuba. This would be a tangible and immediate 
step that could be taken to increase the flow of dollars into the struggling Cuban 
economy and to help avoid a mass exodus of Cubans to the United States. 
 
                                                 
1   For an industry viewpoint on this see Roney (1999).  15
With the possibility of future political change in Cuba, its continued economic 
difficulties, and the strong emotional linkage which exists between Americans of 
Cuban descent and those on the island, pressures to liberalize U.S. sugar imports 
might come from a source unrelated to international trade negotiations. The 
likelihood of such outside pressure for change in U.S. sugar policy will increase if 
the negotiations take some time to conclude.  
 
Dairy 
If substantial progress is to be made in the negotiations, it will be necessary to 
liberalize trade in dairy products. The attitude of the U.S. dairy industry to the 
negotiations will be important. 
 
Traditionally, the U.S. dairy industry has taken a protectionist stance on trade. U.S. 
dairy policy played a significant role in undermining the application of the GATT to 
agriculture in the 1950s. The United States was forced to obtain a waiver for the 
introduction of import quotas for dairy products under Section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1955. As Josling et al observe this “was to have a 
chilling effect on international agricultural trade policy…. and demonstrated that 
agricultural products were indeed subject to different trade rules” (page 29). 
 
Until the 1990s the main concerns of the dairy industry with respect to trade were to 
ensure that any loopholes in the quota system that would allow greater imports of 
dairy products were closed, and that government funds were available to export 
“surplus” dairy products. 
 
The current situation is far less clear cut primarily because of reforms in domestic 
dairy policies. Under the FAIR act dairy policy has been changing dramatically. A 
phase-out of dairy price support was initiated with the program scheduled for 
elimination on January 1, 2000. Under previous legislation government purchases 
of butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese were used to prevent the farm price of milk 
from falling below a specified level. In addition it was decided to consolidate the 
then 33 federal marketing orders into 10-14 orders. The federal order system had 
been used as a price discrimination mechanism to maintain higher consumer prices 
for fluid milk than would otherwise be the case, and to limit interregional 
competition in the dairy industry. 
 
On March 31, 1999 the Secretary of Agriculture announced that the consolidated 
milk marketing order system will be composed of 11 orders. He also proposed a 
new pricing mechanism for milk in which the price would reflect the market value 
of its various components, such as butterfat and protein. It is unclear whether these 
reforms will be successful. The change in the pricing mechanism is generating 
opposition in some parts of the dairy industry and may not succeed. The industry as 
a whole is unsure as to whether it wants to move in a market-oriented direction. 
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The changes in dairy policy under the FAIR Act would lead to greater market 
orientation in the U.S. dairy market. In addition, the industry is undergoing major 
structural changes. Dairy farms are growing larger; some very large dairy farms 
have been established in certain areas of the country, most notably the west and 
southwest. In addition, there has been substantial activity in mergers and 
consolidation activity among cooperatives and private dairy processors. These 
changes are generating stresses and strains in the industry. Some producers would 
like to preserve a more protected market and look to price enhancement by 
controlling the allocation of milk to various uses as a means of maintaining 
profitability. Others are focusing on controlling costs and increasing technical and 
economic efficiency in order to increase profitability. 
 
It is likely that with continued advances in technical and economic efficiency, a 
substantial part of the U.S. dairy industry would be competitive in international 
markets if world trade in dairy products were liberalized (Blandford, forthcoming). 
Some in the industry view international trade liberalization as an opportunity for 
expansion, but this is probably not a widely held view. If the U.S. dairy industry 
were to add its support to trade liberalization efforts, this would provide a powerful 
impetus to the negotiations. In any event, the evolving attitude of the dairy industry 
to international trade is likely to have an important impact on the U.S. negotiating 





How might U.S. objectives relate to those of other major players?
 2 
 
In the Uruguay Round, the key to conclusion of an agreement was reaching an 
accommodation on domestic and international trade policy between the European 
Union and the United States. It was necessary to take into account the interests of 
other key players, for example, Japan on the question of rice, and to provide some 
concessions to other interest groups, for example, developing countries on the issue 
of compensation for possible increases in the costs of food imports. However, these 
were less important than the E.U.-U.S. deal that was concluded at Blair House in 
November 1992, which itself was made possible by final acceptance of the need to 
undertake a more ambitious reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 
the Union. 
 
In the new round of negotiations, it will again be important for the Union and the 
United States to reach an accommodation on their policies, although the outcome of 
the round is unlikely to be entirely dominated by these two players. Nevertheless, 
the negotiating position of the European Union will be critical, and as in the 
                                                 
2  For a detailed analysis of the implementation of the URAA in the major countries and their 
attitudes to further changes in the upcoming round see Josling and Tangermann, 1999.  17
Uruguay Round its willingness to make further changes in the CAP will be of major 
importance. 
 
The European Union 
Despite changes in the Common Agricultural Policy as a result of the MacSharry 
reforms of the early 1990s, fundamental weaknesses persist. The situation in the 
grains sector has improved as support prices have been reduced, allowing 
domestically produced grain to become more competitive with imports, particularly 
in livestock feed. However, the dairy and sugar sectors are only kept in a rough 
equilibrium by means of production quotas and the beef and lamb sectors are prone 
to overproduction. The costs of the policy have become increasingly visible – more 
of the burden has been passed from consumers to taxpayers as price supports have 
been replaced by direct payments. More important, the stated aim of the Union to 
expand its membership by including countries primarily from eastern and central 
Europe, poses major problems. To provide farmers in the new entrants with the 
same generous direct payments made in the current Member States would be 
expensive. Even without such payments, coping with the increased supply that 
would result from the increase in prices in some of the new entrants would be 
problematic, particularly given the restrictions on subsidized exports agreed under 
the URAA. 
 
In recognition of these potential problems, the European Commission called for 
further reform of the CAP under its “Agenda 2000” proposals. Characteristically, 
the actual reforms agreed by the E.U. ministers of agriculture in Berlin in March 
1999 were less radical than those proposed by the Commission and are unlikely to 
resolve all the underlying weaknesses in the CAP. These reforms, which will create 
some reduction in support prices but at the cost of higher direct payments, are 
unlikely to be sufficient to solve the problems that would be created by an 
expansion of the Union. Nor do they allow much room for trade liberalization in the 




If significant progress is to be made in the upcoming negotiations on reducing 
tariffs, increasing market access and reducing or eliminating export subsidies, 
further reform of the CAP will be needed. If the United States and other countries 
take an aggressive stance on trade liberalization, the conclusion of an agreement 
will be tied to the European Union’s ability to achieve a further modification of the 
CAP that will be acceptable to domestic constituencies, the new entrants, and third 
countries. This will pose even greater challenges to the ingenuity of the European 
Commission and the political leadership in the Member States than did the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations. 
 
                                                 
3   A more in-depth analysis of the agreed reforms to the CAP and their relationship to the upcoming 
round of negotiations is provided by Swinbank, 1999.  18
Further complicating the situation in Europe, is the increasing public attention being 
paid to a number of domestic objectives that are being interpreted as being under 
threat through trade liberalization. The two major areas involved are: 
• = Multifunctionality – an ill-defined concept which is generally 
interpreted as agriculture’s role as the supplier of a number of 
desirable “outputs” in addition to food and fiber. These attributes 
may range from environmental goods, such as landscape, to 
employment, social stability, and the maintenance of a viable 
rural economy and rural population. It is also argued that there is 
a “European model” of agriculture whose characteristics are 
worth preserving. Whatever the economic merits of these 
concepts, which would seem to have validity only in so far as the 
supply of identifiable public goods is concerned, they are used as 
arguments for preventing the exposure of European agriculture to 
international competition.  
• = Consumer issues – these range from concerns over food safety 
(whether objectively based, or largely subjective in nature) to 
preferences for certain methods of production (e.g. relating to 
animal welfare). One issue – that of genetically modified 
organisms – is particularly problematic since it falls in both 
categories. Again, whatever the merits of the issues involved, 
they are often used as arguments for limiting imports. 
 
Even if it were possible to convince European interest groups that the achievement 
of domestic policy objectives did not require the restriction of imports, it may be 
difficult to avoid the use of direct payments that influence production and hence 
trade. The supply of a public good (e.g. a particular type of landscape) may require 
a particular production system or level of agricultural output. On this basis, the 
European Union and other countries may seek to use this argument to justify the 
legitimacy and continued use of “blue box” payments. 
 
The multifunctionality argument and consumer concerns in Europe, which are 
gaining in political prominence not only in the Union but also in a number of other 
countries such as Norway and Switzerland, could be used as the basis for 
mobilizing opposition to trade liberalization beyond the farm lobbies. This could 
complicate substantially the process of reaching an agreement with the Union on 
further trade liberalization. 
 
Japan 
The Japanese position in the upcoming negotiations is fairly easy to predict. 
Japanese negotiators will seek to minimize further concessions on market access, 
particularly for the most sensitive commodity – rice. In this it will receive support 
from some other Asian countries, most notably Korea. 
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In addition to the multifunctionality argument, which it also espouses, Japan will 
stress “food security” as an issue, by which it means its ability to limit the exposure 
of the domestic rice industry to international competition and a consequent decline 
in domestic rice production. Although it is questionable whether one of the richest 
countries in the world would ever be in a position of being unable to obtain 
sufficient supplies of food from international sources, Japan will press the food 
security issue in the negotiations. 
 
Developing countries 
Many developing countries, particularly the food importers, feel that their interests 
were not furthered by the Uruguay Round Agreement. The Agreement did include a 
provision that provided the possibility of compensation for the poorest food 
importing countries, should food prices increase as a result of trade liberalization. 
During the mid-1990s, when the prices of basic commodities increased markedly 
there were calls for such compensation, but these largely went unanswered. Despite 
the recent decline in world prices, particularly grain prices, developing countries 
will seek to have a greater impact on the outcome of the upcoming round of 
negotiations, although whether they will be successful remains to be seen. 
 
The Cairns group 
The Cairns group is a group of exporting countries that joined together in an attempt 
to exert collective influence on the Uruguay Round negotiations. It currently has 
fifteen members, drawn largely from Asia and Latin America.
4 Some of the 
members of the group have conflicting emotions on agricultural trade liberalization. 
For example, Canada would have at least as much trouble as the United States in 
trying to convince its agricultural interests that an aggressive liberalization of dairy 
trade should be pursued. Indonesia would likely have problems with rice trade 
liberalization. One of the original members, Hungary, has withdrawn from the 
group since it is seeking to become a member of an expanded European Union. It 
now views its interests to lie more in obtaining higher prices and subsidies that E.U. 
membership might offer, than in pressing for access to export markets. 
Nevertheless, in general the Cairns Group is likely to press for substantial progress 
in liberalizing trade in the upcoming round of negotiations. 
 
                                                 
4    Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay.  20
 
 
Concluding Comments  
 
A review of the history of U.S. trade policy shows a mixture of both liberalizing 
and protectionist tendencies (Blandford 1990). This same mixture is in evidence 
today. For example, at the same time as the United States has been pressing for the 
opening of European markets to its beef, it has recently imposed restrictions on 
imports of lamb from Australia and New Zealand. Because of the nature of the U.S. 
political system and the alternating cooperation and competition that takes place 
between the President and the Congress, U.S. trade policy often appears to be 
inconsistent to the outside world. To the extent that a “U.S. position” on the 
upcoming round of trade negotiations can be identified, this is broadly one that 
leans towards greater liberalization. The strength of this leaning is likely to be 
heavily influenced by the outcome of the national elections in 2000.  
 
U.S. negotiators will be acutely aware of the constraints within which they operate, 
particularly in terms of domestic politics. Their ability to pursue trade liberalization 
will be affected by the state of the U.S. economy and agriculture at the time the 
negotiations take place. As in other countries, freer trade is easier to accept when 
markets are buoyant and prices are favourable. It is less palatable when the opposite 
conditions apply. 
 
Whatever the negotiating position that ultimately emerges in the United States, 
reaching agreement in the upcoming round will likely prove to be even more 
difficult and protracted than under the Uruguay Round. The range of issues to be 
dealt with is now broader and more complex. There is likely to be more vocal 
opposition to trade liberalization by certain interest groups, particularly 
environmental and consumer groups. Reconciling domestic objectives with trade 
liberalization will prove a challenge, particularly when many countries are 
unwilling (or unable!) to be explicit in defining those objectives. However, the key 
to success in the round will be to find some way to accommodate key domestic 
concerns while at the same time opening markets to freer trade and greater 
competition. It would be unrealistic to assume that the WTO negotiations will 
provide the means for addressing all the domestic concerns that are involved, but 
the negotiations will have little chance of success if they are viewed by the public at 
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